Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean by Adriana D. Kugler
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin
American and the Caribbean
Volume Author/Editor: James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagés,
editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-32282-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/heck04-1
Conference Date: November 16-17, 2000
Publication Date: August 2004
Title: The Effect of Job Security Regulations on Labor Market
Flexibility. Evidence from the Colombian Labor Market
Reform
Author: Adriana D. Kugler
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c100703.1 Introduction
Job security regulations are usually considered to inhibit labor market
ﬂexibility by reducing the ability of ﬁrms to hire and ﬁre workers. While
severance pay and other job security provisions admittedly protect work-
ers from unjust termination, these laws may also adversely aﬀect workers
by reducing their ability to ﬁnd new jobs. State-mandated severance pay
and job security requirements are equivalent to taxes on job destruction
that reduce ﬁrms’ incentives not only to dismiss but also to hire new work-
ers. In fact, it has often been suggested that the elevated severance pay and
job security requirements in Europe are in part to blame for the high un-
employment levels in this continent.
The perception that reducing ﬁring costs would help to reduce unem-
ployment by enhancing labor market ﬂexibility, through increased worker
turnover into and out of unemployment, has driven several European
countries to introduce labor market reforms in this direction. In particular,
a number of countries, including England, France, Germany, and Spain,
introduced temporary contracts during the 1980s as a way of reducing sev-
erance payments and payments for unjust dismissals. In contrast, Ameri-
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Jairo Augusto Nuñez provided the National Household Surveys.can labor markets became more rigid during the 1980s. During this decade,
a number of states in the United States introduced indemnities for unjust
dismissals, thus creating exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Although the evidence on the eﬀects of these legislative changes on em-
ployment and unemployment in Europe and the United States has been
ambiguous, reforms to reduce labor market rigidities have also been advo-
cated and implemented in a number of less-developed countries. In less-
developed countries the eﬀects of these reforms are considered to be even
greater, as labor market regulations are considered not only to discourage
hiring and ﬁring but also to encourage noncompliance with labor legisla-
tion and the expansion of the informal sector.
In this paper, I consider the incidence of a substantial reduction of ﬁring
costs on ﬂexibility and unemployment in a less-developed country. In par-
ticular, this paper studies the impact of the Colombian labor market re-
form of 1990, which reduced severance payments substantially, on worker
ﬂows into and out of unemployment and its implied net eﬀect on unem-
ployment. I use a microlevel data set from Colombia to examine the eﬀects
of a reduction in ﬁring costs on worker turnover. The labor market reform
introduced in Colombia in 1990 reduced severance payments for all work-
ers hired after 1990 and covered by the legislation (formal-sector workers).
Informal workers, who are not covered by the legislation, were not directly
aﬀected by the reform and, thus, are used as a comparison group in the es-
timations. The empirical analysis exploits this variability in the coverage of
the legislation between formal- and informal-sector workers together with
the temporal change in the Colombian legislation to identify the eﬀects of
a reduction in ﬁring costs on the exit rates out of employment and out of
unemployment. The annual Colombian Household Surveys (conducted in
June) provide information about formal- and informal-sector activity and
allow estimating hazard rates for formal and informal workers, before and
after the reform. The results of the hazard models using a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator indicate that hazard rates into and out of unemploy-
ment increased after the reform for formal-sector workers (covered by the
legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). Moreover, the in-
crease in worker turnover was greater among younger, more educated
workers employed in larger ﬁrms, who are likely to have been aﬀected most
by the changes in the legislation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 3.2 I survey the evi-
dence on the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on employment volatility, the speed of
employment adjustment, and employment levels, labor market participa-
tion, and unemployment for developed countries. In section 3.3 I describe
the legislative changes introduced by the Colombian labor market reform
of 1990 that led to a reduction in severance pay and other ﬁring costs. In
section 3.4 I develop a matching model with endogenous sorting into a for-
mal and an informal sector. The model is useful as it predicts the direct
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eral equilibrium eﬀects of the reform on turnover in the two sectors. Sec-
tion 3.5 discusses the identiﬁcation strategy of the ﬁring cost eﬀects on
worker turnover. In section 3.6 I describe the data and present the results
on the incidence of ﬁring costs on the exit rates into and out of unemploy-
ment. In section 3.7 I use the steady-state condition from the model to-
gether with the results in section 3.6 to estimate the net impact of the re-
form on unemployment. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Review of the Literature
The perception that ﬂexible labor markets promote employment and re-
duce unemployment is widely accepted. However, the theoretical and em-
pirical evidence on the net eﬀects of ﬁring costs on employment and un-
employment is ambiguous.
Past theoretical work on the eﬀects of ﬁring costs shows that while re-
ductions (increases) in ﬁring costs are expected to increase (reduce) hiring
and ﬁring as well as employment volatility, the net eﬀects of reductions in
ﬁring costs on employment and unemployment are ambiguous. Theoreti-
cally, the net eﬀect of ﬁring costs on employment is very sensitive to the as-
sumptions of the model. The net eﬀect of ﬁring costs on employment de-
pends crucially on whether the entry-exit margin is considered and on the
stochastic process assumed to be generating the demand shocks. Hopen-
hayn and Rogerson (1993) simulate the eﬀect of ﬁring costs in a general
equilibrium framework with ﬁrm entry and exit, and they ﬁnd that an in-
crease in ﬁring costs reduces employment. In contrast, Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) consider a partial equilibrium model with a monopolistic
ﬁrm and ﬁnd that employment increases slightly with ﬁring costs, because
the ﬁring eﬀect dominates the hiring eﬀect. In addition, Bentolila and
Dolado (1994) argue that in an insider-outsider model à la Lindbeck and
Snower (1988), ﬁring costs may strengthen the position of insiders and in-
crease their employment while reducing the employment of outsiders.
Similarly, past empirical evidence indicates that lower ﬁring costs are re-
lated to greater employment volatility, but the evidence of the net eﬀect of
ﬁring costs on employment and unemployment in these studies has been
mixed. Bertola (1990) constructs job security indexes for ten countries and
ﬁnds that job security provisions are negatively correlated with the vari-
ance of employment and with unemployment’s response to output changes
(i.e., Okun’s coeﬃcient). Using a panel of retail ﬁrms in the United States,
Anderson (1993) ﬁnds that the seasonal variability in employment is lower
in ﬁrms facing higher adjustment costs. Moreover, a number of studies
have related the speed of employment adjustment to shocks to the level of
ﬁring costs. As predicted by the theory, Anderson (1993) ﬁnds that the
probability of responding to shocks is negatively correlated to the adjust-
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speed of employment adjustment to shocks fell in nonunionized industries
over the 1980s in the United States, when exceptions to the employment-
at-will doctrine were being introduced. Using British data, Burgess (1988)
ﬁnds a lower speed of employment in industries subject to higher ﬁring
costs. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1993) also ﬁnd that employment adjust-
ments over the business cycle increased in Spain after the introduction of
temporary contracts in 1984. Thus, these studies provide evidence of the
greater employment volatility when ﬁring costs are lower.
The evidence on the impact of ﬁring costs on employment and unem-
ployment, however, appears mixed. Lazear (1990) uses cross-country data
from twenty-two developed countries over twenty-nine years and ﬁnds ev-
idence that suggests that high severance payments and advance notice re-
quirements reduce employment and labor force participation. Grubb and
Wells (1993) construct job security indices for Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and also ﬁnd a negative
correlation between job security and employment. Di Tella and MacCul-
loch (2004) use a measure of ﬂexibility provided by employers, and they
ﬁnd that ﬂexibility is positively correlated with employment and partici-
pation and, to a lesser degree, with unemployment. In contrast, Bertola
(1990) ﬁnds evidence suggesting that job security provisions are unrelated
to medium- and long-run employment. Nickell and Layard (1999) ﬁnd that
employment and labor force levels are lower when employment protection
legislation (EPL) is stricter, but since they are exploiting cross-country
variation they cannot control for the fact that female labor force partici-
pation is lower and EPL stricter in Southern European countries. In fact,
they ﬁnd that the results disappear when they consider a sample of adult
males. The OECD’s Employment Outlook (1999) exploits additional tem-
poral variation in EPL and ﬁnds no eﬀect of EPL on aggregate employ-
ment. However, consistent with the story that EPL protects insiders, the
Employment Outlook ﬁnds that EPL increases the employment of adult
men and reduces the employment of young workers and women.
Exploiting the temporal change in the labor legislation across states in
the United States, Dertouzos and Karoly (1993) ﬁnd that employment lev-
els fell in states that introduced more stringent employment protection. In
contrast, Miles (2000) ﬁnds no eﬀect of the changes in unjust dismissal
costs in the United States on aggregate employment. However, both Autor
(2003) and Miles (2000) ﬁnd that stricter employment protection con-
tributed to the rise in temporary employment in the United States over the
1980s. Anderson (1993), instead, exploits the experience-rating feature of
the U.S. unemployment insurance system to quantify adjustment costs and
ﬁnds higher average employment in ﬁrms subject to higher adjustment
costs. The mixed results observed in the literature are not surprising if one
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simultaneity problems, and endogeneity of the legislation. The panel stud-
ies, while mitigating the concerns of omitted variable biases and simul-
taneity, are subject to the possibility of endogeneity of the legislation as
well as to selection biases. Thus, while the evidence on the eﬀects of ﬁring
costs on the volatility of employment appears robust, the net eﬀect of ﬁr-
ing costs on employment and unemployment is not as clear.1
More recently, a handful of studies have exploited the diﬀerential varia-
tion in labor legislation for certain groups of workers to set up natural ex-
periments of the impact of ﬁring costs using microdata. While Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001) ﬁnd no eﬀect of the Americans with Disabilities Act on
separations of disabled relative to nondisabled employees, Oyer and Schae-
fer (2000) ﬁnd substitution of individual dismissals for mass layoﬀs after
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 for groups covered by the legis-
lation. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) and Autor, Donohue, and Schwab
(2003) ﬁnd decreased hires and employment in those states that introduced
certain unjust dismissal provisions over the 1980s. Kugler and Pica (2003)
also ﬁnd decreased hires and dismissals of workers in small relative to large
ﬁrms after the introduction of the 1990 Italian labor market reform, which
raised dismissal costs for ﬁrms with less than ﬁfteen employees. Finally,
Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) ﬁnd increased hiring of young work-
ers and increased separations of older workers after the introduction of the
Spanish labor market reform of 1997, which reduced dismissal costs and
payroll taxes for these groups of workers.
While microstudies solve some of the problems faced by studies relying
on macrodata, these studies have focused on the impact of ﬁring costs in
developed countries. There is little evidence on the impact of ﬁring costs in
less-developed countries. In the next section, I describe the legislative
change introduced in Colombia in 1990, which allows me to exploit the
temporal variability and the variability in coverage of labor legislation in
order to estimate the impact of ﬁring costs on turnover and unemployment
in a less-developed country.
3.3 Changes in the Colombian Institutional Framework
In 1990, Colombia introduced a labor market reform that substantially
reduced the costs of dismissing workers. The Colombian reform reduced
severance payments, widened the deﬁnition of “just” dismissals, extended
the use of temporary contracts, and sped up the process of mass dismissals.
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1. However, a number of recent studies, including Angrist and Kugler (2003), Bertola, Blau,
and Kahn (2002), and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), ﬁnd that the negative eﬀects of labor
market institutions on employment and unemployment are realized when economies are
faced with bad shocks.All of these policy changes reduced the costs of ﬁring workers covered by
the legislation after 1990.2 The reform thus reduced ﬁring costs for ﬁrms in
the formal sector but not for informal ﬁrms, which did not comply with la-
bor legislation.
Although the reform introduced various legislative changes simulta-
neously, the one major policy change that decreased the costs of dismissals
was the reduction of severance payments.3 The reform reduced the sever-
ance paid for dismissals in three ways. First, prior to the reform, employ-
ers were mandated to pay severance of one month per year worked based
on the salary at the time of separation. After the reform, employers were
instead required to deposit a monthly contribution equivalent to one
month of the yearly salary at that moment in time to an individual sever-
ance payments savings account (Fondo de Cesantías), which would be ac-
cessible to workers in the event of separation. Thus, total severance pay-
ments were reduced because the monthly payment per year worked was no
longer based on the higher salary at the time of separation but, rather, on
the salary during each month. Second, prior to the reform, workers could
obtain advance payments from their severance to use for investments in
education and housing, which would only be credited to the employer in
nominal terms in the event of separation. After the reform, although the
withdrawal of funds was still permitted, these loans were now credited to
the employer in real terms. According to Ocampo (1987) the fact that,
prior to the reform, withdrawals were credited to the employer in nominal
terms implied, on average, a cost of 35 percent of the total severance pay-
ments in the manufacturing sector prior to 1990. Finally, the change in the
legislation reduced severance pay, because the introduction of guaranteed
severance payments essentially turned severance payments into a deferred
compensation scheme, allowing workers lower wages in exchange for fu-
ture severance.4Not all workers were, however, aﬀected in the same way by
the reduction in severance payments. As indicated previously, workers
hired by informal ﬁrms are not covered by the legislation and, thus, should
not have been aﬀected directly by the reform. Moreover, family workers,
temporary workers, and workers employed by ﬁrms with ﬁve or less em-
ployees are not entitled to severance payments, and domestic workers and
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2. In addition to the labor market reform of 1990, a social security reform was passed in
1994 and implemented in 1995 and 1996. However, since the social security reform increased
payroll taxes, the increase in nonwage recurrent costs of this reform implies diﬀerent eﬀects
on turnover than the reduction in dismissal costs of the labor market reform of 1990. More-
over, the study by Gruber (1997) of a similar reform in Chile ﬁnds no eﬀects of payroll taxes
on employment because recurrent costs are passed on to wages.
3. Note that both before and after the reform, employers were exempt from the payment of
severance in cases when employees were dismissed because of undue care, sabotage, or release
of employers’ proprietary information.
4. Kugler (2002) studies the impact of a change from a standard severance payments sys-
tem into a system of severance payments savings accounts.workers employed by ﬁrms with very little capital are entitled only to a sev-
erance payment of ﬁfteen days per year worked.
A second important change introduced by the reform was the change in
the legislation with regards to indemnities for “unjust” dismissals. First,
the deﬁnition of unjust dismissals changed in 1990. Prior to the reform,
just-cause dismissals included dismissals of employees because of fraud,
violence, undue care, sabotage, discipline problems, deﬁcient perfor-
mance, and release of proprietary information. After the reform, the deﬁ-
nition of just-cause dismissals was extended to include any dismissal for
failure to comply with ﬁrm regulations and instructions from one’s super-
visors. The exemptions for the payment of indemnities for unjust dis-
missals were thus extended after the 1990 reform, reducing ﬁring costs for
formal ﬁrms. Second, the reform eliminated the ability of workers with
more than ten years of tenure to sue for back pay and reinstatement. At the
same time, however, the reform increased the cost of “unjustly” dismissing
workers with more than ten years of tenure (see table 3.1), and this may
have increased the incentives for ﬁrms to dismiss workers just before reach-
ing ten years of seniority.5 Thus, these changes in unjust dismissal legisla-
tion can be expected to have the greatest impact on formal workers with in-
termediate levels of seniority.
Another important change brought about by the reform was the exten-
sion of the use of ﬁxed-term contracts.6 Prior to 1990, ﬁxed-term contracts
were allowed for a minimum duration of a year.7 After the reform, these
ﬁxed-term contracts were extended to contracts of less than a year (renew-
able up to three times). This change in the legislation thus lowered ﬁring
costs for ﬁrms hiring workers for less than a year and would be expected to
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Table 3.1 Indemnities for Unjust Dismissal by Tenure
Pre- and Postreform Prereform Postreform
Less Than a Year  1 and  5 years  5 and  10 years  10 years  10 years
45 days 45 days and 15  45 days and 20  45 days and 30  45 days and 40 
additional days  additional days  additional days  additional days 
after the ﬁrst year after the ﬁrst year after the ﬁrst year after the ﬁrst year
5. Note, however, that employees with more than ten years of experience who were hired
before 1990 could also choose to be covered by the new regime with severance payments sav-
ings accounts.
6. While temporary contracts are subject to payroll taxes and social security contributions,
these contracts are not subject to severance pay and unjust dismissal legislation as long as
contracts end by the agreed date.
7. Despite legislation on ﬁxed-term contracts, however, ﬁrms could circumvent this restric-
tion by subcontracting workers from temp agencies even prior to the reform.have increased turnover among formal workers with less than a year of
tenure after the reform.
An additional change introduced by the reform was a reduction in the
advance notice required for mass dismissals. While advance notice re-
quirements for mass layoﬀs existed prior to the reform (see table 3.2), the
reform introduced penalties to bureaucrats who did not process requests
for mass layoﬀs quickly. If such threats to bureaucrats were eﬀective, this
change in the legislation should have speeded up the dismissal process for
formal ﬁrms and lowered their costs of ﬁring.
Finally, the reform also introduced a new type of contract that elimi-
nated severance payments altogether. This type of contract (Salario Inte-
gral) allowed formal workers who earned more than ten times the mini-
mum wage to opt out of severance payments, indemnities for unjust
dismissals, beneﬁts (except paid vacations), social security contributions,
and payroll taxes in exchange for a higher salary. The introduction of this
type of contract eﬀectively allowed ﬁrms to eliminate the cost of dismiss-
ing highly paid workers who opted for the Salario Integral. Thus, one
would expect to ﬁnd a greater eﬀect of the reform on formal-sector work-
ers with salaries above ten times the minimum wage.8
The changes in severance pay legislation, unjust dismissal legislation,
temporary contracts, and mandatory advance notice introduced by the
Colombian labor market reform should have directly reduced the costs of
dismissals for formal ﬁrms and increased turnover in the formal sector.
Moreover, it is often argued that job security regulations simply encourage
the expansion of the informal sector, and one would thus expect for this
type of reform to have encouraged greater compliance with the legislation.
The next section introduces a matching model with ﬁring costs, which
shows the direct eﬀect of a reduction in ﬁring costs on formal turnover as
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Table 3.2 Advance Notice Requirements by Firm Size
Threshold for Advance Notiﬁcation
Firm Size of Collective Dismissals
 10 and  50 employees 30% of the workforce
 50 and  100 employees 20% of the workforce
 100 and  200 employees 15% of the workforce
 200 and  500 employees 9% of the workforce
 500 and  1,000 employees 7% of the workforce
 1,000 employees 5% of the workforce
8. By 1994 only 1.5 percent of all workers in manufacturing and 0.6 percent of workers in
commerce had opted for this type of contract (Lora and Henao 1995). Since the surveys used
in the analysis do not indicate whether a worker indeed opted for an Integral Salary, we ex-
amine whether the impact of the reform was greater on older and highly educated workers
who are more likely to earn above ten times the minimum wage.well as the indirect eﬀects on formal and informal turnover through the
compositional changes of ﬁrms in each sector. The model shows that a re-
form that reduces dismissal costs may not only increase turnover but also
increase compliance with state-mandated ﬁring costs.
3.4 A Sorting Model of Compliance with Job Security Provisions
This section presents a matching model with a formal sector and an in-
formal sector in which ﬁrms sort themselves between the two sectors.
Firms producing in the formal sector must comply with labor legislation
and have to pay state-mandated severance in the event of a dismissal, while
ﬁrms in the informal sector do not comply with job security legislation and
avoid the severance payment. Productivity in the informal sector is, how-
ever, lower overall than in the formal sector, because informal ﬁrms must
produce at a smaller scale to remain inconspicuous to the authorities.
Moreover, the presence of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component to productivity in the
model implies that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms with higher idiosyncratic produc-
tivity self-sort into the formal sector while ﬁrms with lower idiosyncratic
productivity self-sort into the informal sector.
The model predicts that the probability of being dismissed by a formal
ﬁrm is lower because of the legislated severance payments, but also because
formal ﬁrms are more productive. Also, a reduction in severance payments
increases the probability of dismissals in the formal sector through a direct
eﬀect on the ﬁring costs. In addition, however, the reduction in ﬁring costs
has eﬀects on the idiosyncratic composition of ﬁrms in each sector as well
as on the wages paid in each sector. This model thus highlights the poten-
tial biases that may arise in empirical studies that attempt to quantify the
eﬀects of ﬁring costs.
3.4.1 Assumptions
In this model, heterogeneous ﬁrms may choose to produce in a formal
sector, in which they must comply with job security provisions, or to pro-
duce in the informal sector, without complying but at the cost of lower
productivity. Workers are identical ex ante, but they may have diﬀerent
productivity ex post depending on how well they match. After a match, the
firm and worker set the wage according to a Nash bargaining solution. Then
the ﬁrm decides whether to keep or dismiss the worker.
Production in Each Sector
Formal and informal production is a function of a sector-speciﬁc com-
ponent, as, of a ﬁrm idiosyncratic component, A, and of the match quality
component,  , and ﬁrms produce with a technology, Y s   as A, for s   F, I.
Sector-speciﬁc productivity is ﬁxed, and it is assumed, without loss of gen-
erality, that aF 1  aI a. The ﬁrm idiosyncratic component comes from
Job Security Regulations and Labor Market Flexibility 191a distribution F(A), and the match quality component comes from a dis-
tribution G( ).
Timing
Firms, ﬁrst, observe their ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. Firms then choose
a sector given the productivity in the sector and their known ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity. Formal and informal ﬁrms hire in the same market, and, im-
mediately after hiring, they observe the match-speciﬁc productivity. Then
ﬁrms and workers bargain over wages. At the end of the process ﬁrms de-
cide whether to keep or dismiss the worker, and formal ﬁrms that do dis-
miss must provide a severance payment, C. However, workers may still be
separated afterward at arrival rates,  Fand  I, due to exogenous reasons, in
which case ﬁrms do not pay severance.
Matching
All ﬁrms and workers search in the same market. The arrival rate of ap-
plicants to formal and informal ﬁrms is the same, q( )   m(1/ , 1), where
  v/u. The arrival rate of job opportunities is  q( ), and workers receive
oﬀers from formal or informal ﬁrms with a given probability that depends
on the share of ﬁrms in each sector.
Wage Setting
Each ﬁrm and worker pair sets the wage based on Nash bargaining.
Wages are set after ﬁrm-speciﬁc and match-speciﬁc productivities are ob-
served. In this model, all wages are aﬀected by job security legislation, be-
cause the severance pay raises the utility of the unemployed and thus raises
the reservation wage of all workers.9
3.4.2 Solution to the Model
The model is solved by backward induction. First, the solution for the
dismissal choices in each sector is found. Second, the Nash bargaining so-
lution of the wage is determined. Finally, the marginal ﬁrm between the
two sectors is determined in order to solve for the split of ﬁrms between the
formal and informal sectors.
Dismissal Decisions
The present discounted proﬁts for a ﬁrm with a ﬁlled job is J s, and the
present discounted value of a vacant job is V s, for s   F, I (formal and in-
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9. As pointed out by Lazear (1990), in a perfectly competitive market, the state-mandated
severance pay could be undone given the proper contract. In particular, the worker would
have to post a bond for the cost of the severance pay to the ﬁrm upon the signing of the con-
tract. However, as in Lazear (1990), it is assumed that the state-mandated severance pay is not
completely oﬀset by a private transfer, because workers may be liquidity constrained and be-
cause of moral hazard problems on the part of ﬁrms.formal, respectively). Thus, the asset equation of a ﬁlled and a vacant job
are given by the following equations, respectively:
rJ s   Y s   ws    s (V s   J s)
rV s   q( )(J s   V s).
As there is free entry, and all proﬁt opportunities are exploited, V s   0.
Thus,













Once matched, a ﬁrm must choose whether to keep or dismiss a worker. A
formal ﬁrm has to pay a cost, C, if it decides to dismiss, while an informal
ﬁrm does not have to pay the ﬁring cost. Thus, the minimum match-
productivity that triggers a dismissal by a formal ﬁrm is given by
   F   .
For informal ﬁrms, the trigger productivity is given by





Given ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and wages, the probability that a formal
ﬁrm dismisses a worker is less than the probability that an informal ﬁrm
dismisses; that is,    F     I ⇔ G(   F)   G(   I). This is both because formal
ﬁrms must pay severance payments and because sector productivity is
higher if a ﬁrm is producing formally.
Determination of Wages
Wages are set by each ﬁrm-worker pair before the match quality is real-
ized. Wages are set according to Nash bargaining, and each side has the
same bargaining power. Thus, formal and informal ﬁrms split their surplus
equally with workers, as follows:
Je
F   V F   G(   F)C   Ee
F   U,
JI
e   V I   EI





Iare the expected discounted proﬁts of a formal and
informal job and the expected lifetime utilities of a formal and an informal
worker, respectively, and U is the expected lifetime utility of an unem-
ployed worker. The asset equations of employed and unemployed workers
are given by
rEs
e   ws    (U   Es
e),
rU    q( )(Ee   U),
wF   C[r    F   q( )]
   
A
Job Security Regulations and Labor Market Flexibility 193where Ee is the expected lifetime utility of employment for an unemployed
job seeker. Since an unemployed worker is uncertain about whether he will
be hired in a formal or an informal job, his expected utility of employment is
Ee   Pr(formal oﬀer){[1   G(   F)] Ee
F   G(   F)C} 
  Pr(informal oﬀer) [1   G(   I)]EI
e.
Solving for (Es
e – U) in each sector and substituting into the equal split
equation just given determines the wages in each sector:
wF   ,
wI   .
Wages are expected to be higher in the formal sector because of the higher
sector productivity in formal jobs. However, as shown, in equilibrium the
average match quality is lower in formal-sector ﬁrms, as ﬁrms in this sector
are more likely to keep less productive matches than informal ﬁrms. Hence,
the lower quality of the matches in the formal sector lowers the expected
wage in the formal sector. In addition, wages are aﬀected not only by aver-
age productivity but also by the level of the ﬁring cost. Both formal and in-
formal wages are raised by the presence of state-mandated severance pay,
because the severance payment raises workers’ reservation wages.
Sorting into Sectors
Given dismissal choices and wages, ﬁrms choose whether to sort into the
formal or the informal sector. The beneﬁt of producing formally is that the
productivity of this sector is higher, but the cost of producing in this sector
relative to the informal sector is the payment of state-mandated severance
in the event of a dismissal. As ﬁrms are heterogeneous, ﬁrms may split be-
tween the two sectors. Firms produce formally if the diﬀerence between the
expected stream of proﬁts of formal and informal ﬁrms is nonnegative—
that is, if (Je
F – JI
e   0), and they produce informally if it is negative—that
is, if (Je
F – JI
e)   0. As the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity increases, the output
gains in the formal sector relative to the informal sector increase. Thus, the
gains from going into the formal sector are greater for more productive
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, Acrit] produce in the informal sector, while ﬁrms with 
A   [Acrit, A  ] produce in the formal sector, where Acrit is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity of the ﬁrm that is marginal between producing formally and
producing informally. Consequently, since formal ﬁrms are more produc-
tive in equilibrium, they dismiss less often and pay higher wages than in-
formal ﬁrms.10
3.4.3 Severance Pay and Turnover
The presence of state-mandated costs and higher productivity in the
formal sector imply diﬀerent hazards into and out of unemployment in the
two sectors. On the one hand, the probability of endogenous dismissal in
the formal sector is likely to be lower than the probability of dismissal in
the informal sector—that is,  q( )(1 – F[Acrit])G(   F)    q( )F(Acrit)G(    I).
On the other hand, the hiring probability will be higher or lower in the for-
mal sector relative to the informal sector depending on the share of ﬁrms
producing in each sector—that is,  q( )(1 – F[Acrit])   q( )F(Acrit). As the
proportion of ﬁrms producing formally increases, then the hiring proba-
bility in the formal sector increases relative to the informal sector.
Moreover, the hazards into and out of unemployment are aﬀected di-
rectly and indirectly by changes in severance pay legislation. First, a re-
duction in state-mandated severance pay has a direct eﬀect on formal ﬁrms
by increasing the threshold match productivity that triggers dismissals.
Second, a reduction of severance payments pushes down wages in both sec-
tors due to the fall in the reservation wage. Wages increase, however, due to
the greater probability of dismissal in the formal sector, and the net eﬀect
on wages in both sectors is positive as well as the eﬀect of wages on turn-
over. Finally, a reduction of severance payments changes the composition
of ﬁrms in each sector. In particular, decreasing severance payments in-
creases the incentives to produce in the formal sector and shifts lower-
productivity ﬁrms that were previously unwilling to produce formally away
from the informal sector. The compositional change increases the dis-
missal and hiring rates in the formal sector due to the greater share of ﬁrms
producing formally.
The direct and indirect eﬀects of a reduction in ﬁring costs on turnover
that emerge in the model illustrate the problems that may arise when try-
ing to estimate the impact of a change in ﬁring costs on turnover. First,
the eﬀects of ﬁring costs on wages imply that the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on
turnover captures not only the direct eﬀect previously mentioned but also
the indirect eﬀect of ﬁring costs on turnover going through wages. This is
not problematic insofar as one is interested in measuring the total eﬀect,
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10. The self-sorting of more productive ﬁrms into the formal sector thus makes evident the
problems of identifying the eﬀect of legislation on turnover, simply by estimating the eﬀect of
ﬁring cost on the hazard rates.both direct and indirect, of ﬁring costs on turnover. However, the self-
sorting of ﬁrms into formal and informal sectors according to their ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity and the eﬀect of the reduction of ﬁring costs on this
self-sorting are likely to introduce selection biases. Finally, if a policy
change occurred simultaneously with a change in the distribution of the
shocks, then one might attribute to the reform an eﬀect that might indeed
be due to a worsening in the distribution of the matches.11 The following
sections discuss an identiﬁcation strategy to deal with the problem of con-
temporaneous changes in the distribution of the shocks and discuss infer-
ence given the presence of a selection problem.
3.5 Identiﬁcation Strategy
3.5.1 Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences
The theory I have laid out suggests that ﬁring costs should only have
direct eﬀects on the exit rates of workers in the formal sector (covered by
the legislation) and not on the exit rates of workers in the informal sector
(uncovered by the legislation). Hence, the ﬁring costs should have direct
eﬀects only on the tenures of formal sector workers and not on the
tenures of workers employed in the informal sector. Similarly, the unem-
ployment duration of workers whose spells end as a result of being hired
in the formal sector should be directly aﬀected by ﬁring costs, but not the
duration of workers whose spells end as a result of being hired in the
informal sector. Comparing the hazards into and out of unemployment
(or tenures and unemployment spells) between formal and informal
workers (covered and uncovered by the legislation) could then provide an
estimate of the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on turnover. The sample counterpart
of the ﬁring cost eﬀect on tenure (unemployment spells) using diﬀerences
would be
 s    (s  
formal   s  
informal),
where h  formal   1/s  
formal, h  informal   1/s  
informal, s  indicates mean tenures (un-
employment spells), and h  indicates mean hazard rates.12 Considering the
simplest possible model of tenure (unemployment duration) with no re-
gressors, tenure (unemployment) depends only on a Formal dummy,
sit     formalit   uit, E(uitformalit)   0.
Given this model, it is easy to see that the diﬀerence of the mean tenures in
the formal and informal sectors provides an estimate of the ﬁring cost
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11. In addition, a change in ﬁring costs is also likely to aﬀect turnover in both sectors
through its indirect eﬀect on wages.
12. This sample counterpart holds as long as the hazards follow a Poisson process.eﬀect,  . This way of estimating the ﬁring cost eﬀect is, however, likely to
be biased for three reasons. First, the two groups may have diﬀerent char-
acteristics and, thus, diﬀerent turnover behavior and diﬀerent mean
tenures and unemployment spells. Including regressors in the model allows
us to control for observable characteristics and helps to solve this problem.
Second, the error term could be correlated with the formal dummy if there
is self-selection into the groups—that is, E(uitformali 1)  E(uitformali
  0). Finally, the two groups may be subject to diﬀerent shocks, and part
of the diﬀerences in turnover patterns—and thus tenures and unemploy-
ment spells—between the groups may be simply capturing these diﬀer-
ences (i.e.,  F    I).
Exploiting the temporal change in the legislation introduced by the la-
bor market reform of 1990, in addition to the variability in coverage be-
tween covered and uncovered workers, allows controlling for self-selection
and for the diﬀerence in shocks across groups. In the model of tenure (un-
employment spells) with no regressors, tenure (unemployment) depends
only on a formal dummy, on a postreform dummy, and on an interaction
term between the two,
sit      0formalit    1Post90it    2formalit   Post90it   uit.
First, if self-selection is constant over time—that is, E(uipre90formali  
1)   E(uipost90formali   1) and E(uipre90formali   0)   E(uipost90formali
  0)—the ﬁring cost eﬀect can be estimated by simply taking diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences:
 s  
gt   (s  
post90   s  
pre90)formal   (s  
post90   s  
pre90)informal,
where h  gt   1/s  
gt. Taking diﬀerences of average tenures (unemployment
duration) for formal workers between the pre-1990 and the post-1990 peri-
ods provides an estimate of the ﬁring cost eﬀect and allows us to diﬀerence
out the biases introduced by self-selection when self-selection is constant
over time. Taking diﬀerences of these diﬀerences with respect to informal
workers (uncovered by the legislation) allows controlling for common
trends that aﬀect both groups, whether it is a constant trend,  , or a chang-
ing trend common to both groups,  1.
As indicated previously, however, it is possible that the two groups are
subject to diﬀerent shocks (i.e.,  F    I). In this case, diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences would work provided that the post-reform shocks can be ad-
justed using prereform trends. Thus, diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences would work
even if the trends were diﬀerent in the two groups under two circumstances.
First, diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences would work if the trends are constant over
time for each group (i.e.,  Fpre90   Fpost90,  Ipre90   Ipost90, and  1 0). Sec-
ond, diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences would also work if the trends change over
time for each group but the trends change by a common factor in both
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 1).13
To estimate the eﬀect of the reform on the hazard rates into and out of
unemployment, the analogue of diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences is estimated us-
ing a formal hazard model. I estimate an exponential model that controls
for observables and includes the formal dummy, the post-1990 dummy, and
the interaction term between the formal and the post-1990 dummy:
h(sitXit)   esp( Xit    0formalit    1Post90it    2formalit   Post90it),
where Xit is a 1   k vector of regressors, and   is a k   1 vector of param-
eters. The vector of covariates, Xit, includes age, education, sex, maritalsta-
tus, number of dependents, the city where the person lives, and industry of
employment. The formal variable is included to control for constant diﬀer-
ences between the groups. Thus,  0 is expected to be negative since the dis-
missal of formal workers is more costly than that of informal workers, both
before and after the reform. The Post90 dummy controls for common
shocks aﬀecting the turnover behavior of all workers after 1990. Finally,
the interaction term of the formal and Post90 dummies is included to esti-
mate the eﬀect of the reduction in ﬁring costs introduced by the reform on
the hazard rates. A test of the impact of the reform is equivalent to a test
that the coeﬃcient on the interaction term,  2, is diﬀerent from zero. In
particular, the test considers whether workers covered by the legislation
changed their turnover behavior relative to uncovered workers after 1990.
3.5.2 Potential Sources of Contamination
The identiﬁcation strategy provided exploits both the temporal variabil-
ity and the cross-section variability available in the Colombian context.
Nonetheless, these diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimators rely on a number
of assumptions that may yield inconsistent estimates of the eﬀects of ﬁring
costs on turnover. First, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimators ignore
the general equilibrium eﬀects of a reduction in ﬁring costs on composition
suggested by the model in the previous section. Second, the estimators rely
on the assumption that trends did not change diﬀerentially across groups
over time. In turn, I consider the implications for the identiﬁcation of the
ﬁring cost eﬀect of having these two potential sources of biases.
As highlighted by the model in the previous section, the reduction of ﬁr-
ing costs introduced by the reform is likely to have generated general equi-
librium eﬀects. In particular, the model given here showed that a reduction
in ﬁring costs not only has direct eﬀects on turnover by reducing the costs
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13. Moreover, even if trends do not change by a common factor in both groups, an uncon-
ventional diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimator could be obtained using a method proposed by
Heckman and Robb (1985). This method assumes that a prereform model that is stable over
time could be ﬁtted for each group and then used to quantify postreform shocks that can be
inserted into equations ﬁtted to postreform data.of dismissals; it also has indirect eﬀects on turnover through its impact on
sector selection. As I have described, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estima-
tor provided is consistent as long as self-selection is constant over time. The
model in the previous section showed, however, that a reduction in ﬁring
costs changes the incentives to sort into the formal and informal sectors and
generates compositional changes that also aﬀect turnover. Thus, a reduc-
tion in ﬁring costs may itself generate compositional changes that invalidate
the assumption of a constant self-selection rule, before and after the re-
form. Yet the model does suggest that the bias introduced by diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences should be negative. In the model, the reduction in ﬁring costs
induces ﬁrms with low ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivities to start producing for-
mally, and the reallocation between sectors thus lowers the average ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity and increases turnover in both sectors. However, the
eﬀect of this change in composition on turnover was shown to be greater in
the informal sector. Thus, while the ﬁring cost eﬀect obtained with diﬀer-
ences-in-diﬀerences is inconsistent, the estimate should be a lower bound
of the eﬀect of the reduction in ﬁring costs on turnover. Moreover, the next
section shows that the change in the size of the two sectors was small, and
this may indicate that the selection bias is unlikely to be large.
The second reason why the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimators may
yield inconsistent estimates of the ﬁring cost eﬀects is the possibility that
trends change diﬀerently over time for formal and informal workers. As
discussed previously, an important assumption that has to be fulﬁlled for
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences to yield consistent estimates of the reform is that
it eliminates the eﬀect of aggregate shocks or trends on turnover. The eﬀect
of aggregate shocks is eliminated if aggregate shocks are common to both
groups or if aggregate shocks are speciﬁc to each group but either the shocks
are constant over time or the shocks change similarly across groups. How-
ever, if trends are diﬀerent across groups and they change diﬀerently over
time, the ﬁring cost eﬀects obtained from diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences are likely
to be biased. Aside from macroshocks, which are common to both groups,
there were two additional shocks occurring during this period that could
have aﬀected turnover. First, trade was liberalized during this period, and,
second, a social security reform was introduced in the early 1990s.
Colombia’s trade liberalization during the early 1990s should be ex-
pected to have increased instability for workers employed in tradable sec-
tors after 1990. Nonetheless, trade shocks should have aﬀected formal and
informal ﬁrms alike, and hence diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences should control
for the eﬀect of these shocks on turnover. If, however, formal ﬁrms were
more likely to produce in tradable sectors and informal ﬁrms in nontrad-
able sectors, then diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences would yield upwardly biased
estimates of the ﬁring cost eﬀect. Hereafter, I estimate diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences across sectors to identify whether the changes in turnover were
greatest in tradable sectors. There are two reasons to believe, however, that
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First, the next section shows no consistent pattern across sectors in the
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates. In addition, diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
for diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes and age groups show that the change in turnover was
greatest for large ﬁrms and middle-aged workers, who should have been
aﬀected most by the changes in job security legislation but not by trade
shocks.
The social security reform introduced during the early 1990s aﬀected
formal ﬁrms but not informal ﬁrms. Thus, the social security reform intro-
duced a shock aﬀecting formal and informal ﬁrms diﬀerentially over time.
As I have described, the social security reform increased employers’ health
and pension contributions and thus increased nonwage labor costs for
ﬁrms complying with the legislation. The increased variable costs should
have reduced hiring and should have had no eﬀect on dismissals in the for-
mal sector relative to the informal sector. This means that the social secu-
rity reform should have generated very diﬀerent eﬀects on turnover from
those predicted by a reduction in ﬁring costs and from those reported in the
next section.14 Moreover, if ﬁrms adjusted to the increased nonwage labor
costs by reducing wages, then the social security reform should not have
had any turnover eﬀects. There is evidence that employers tend to pass on
their nonwage costs to workers as lower wages. For example, Gruber (1997)
shows that the sharp reduction in payroll taxes that followed the privatiza-
tion of Chile’s social security system had no employment eﬀects because
wages adjusted fully to the change in nonwage costs. Moreover, diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences across diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes and age groups show that turnover
changed most among larger ﬁrms and middle-aged workers, who should
have been aﬀected most by the changes in job security legislation but not
by the social security reform.
3.6 Empirical Analysis
This section examines the impact of the Colombian labor market reform
of 1990, which included a substantial reduction in severance payments, on
the hazard rates out of employment and out of unemployment of formal-
sector workers relative to informal-sector workers.
3.6.1 The Data
Description
The data I use to analyze the eﬀects of the reform on the exit rates out
of employment and out of unemployment are drawn from the Colom-
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14. See Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) for an analysis of the diﬀerential eﬀects of ﬁr-
ing costs and payroll taxes on turnover and employment.bianNational Household Surveys (NHS) for June of 1988, 1992, and 1996.
The June NHSs were administered in seven metropolitan areas: Barran-
quilla, Bogota, Bucaramanga, Cali, Manizales, Medellin, and Pasto. The
beneﬁt of using the June surveys is that these include information on in-
formality that allows us to separate formal-sector workers (covered) and
informal-sector workers (uncovered). The June surveys allow us to deﬁne
workers as covered and uncovered in two ways. First, formal (covered)
workers are deﬁned as those workers whose employers make social security
contributions, and informal (uncovered) workers are deﬁned as those
whose employers do not contribute to the social security system. This def-
inition is a useful one, because whether the employer contributes to social
security is a good proxy of whether the employer generally complies with
labor legislation. Second, formal (covered) workers are deﬁned as wage
earners employed in ﬁrms with more than ten employees, and informal
(uncovered) workers as family workers, domestic workers, self-employed
workers (excluding professionals and technicians), and wage earners em-
ployed in ﬁrms with less than ten employees. As discussed previously, em-
ployers with ﬁve or less employees, family workers, and the self-employed
are all exempt from severance pay legislation, and domestic workers and
workers in ﬁrms with low levels of capital are entitled only to half the
amount of severance pay received by other employees. These surveys also
include information on gender, age, marital status, educational attain-
ment, number of dependents, and city and sector of employment, which al-
lows us to control for diﬀerences in turnover due to diﬀerences in charac-
teristics across individuals. In addition, the surveys include information
about whether the worker is permanent or temporary, which allows us to
distinguish the eﬀect that the legislative change on temporary contracts
had on turnover.
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for the covered and uncovered
groups (using the two deﬁnitions), before and after the reform. Columns
(1) and (2) present the characteristics of formal (covered) workers, and
columns (3) and (4) present the characteristics of informal (uncovered)
workers, before and after the reform, respectively. Under both deﬁnitions,
covered workers have more education, are slightly younger, have larger
families, and are more likely to be married and female and to have a per-
manent contract than uncovered workers. However, aside from the diﬀer-
ences in educational attainment, the diﬀerences in characteristics between
the two groups are small. In addition, the changes in characteristics of the
two groups between the pre-1990 and the post-1990 periods have moved in
the same direction and are similar in magnitude. Educational attainment,
average age, and the share of married workers increased in both groups af-
ter 1990, while the share of men, the size of households, and the share of
workers with permanent contracts decreased in both groups after 1990.
These summary statistics suggest that diﬀerences in composition be-
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acteristics may account for part of the changing turnover patterns, and
thus raw diﬀerences in turnover between covered and uncovered groups
should be interpreted carefully. For this reason, in the analysis that follows
I estimate formal hazard models that allow us to control for individual
characteristics. The use of these models is thus crucial for identifying the
ﬁring cost eﬀect of the labor market reform. Another source of composi-
tional bias may arise if, as highlighted by the model, the composition of
ﬁrms changes over time. Table 3.3 shows an increase in the size of the for-
mal (covered) sector after 1990, according to both deﬁnitions. The per-
centage of workers in the formal sector increased from 44.84 percent to
51.05 percent, according to deﬁnition 1, and from 41.47 percent to 45.22
percent according to deﬁnition 2, between the pre- and postreform peri-
ods. Thus, the increase in the size of the formal sector indicates the impor-
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Table 3.3 Basic Characteristics of Formal and Informal Workers, Before and After
the Reform
Formal Informal
Prereform Postreform Prereform Postreform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deﬁnition 1 of informality
Share of total employment 44.84% 15.05% 55.16% 48.95%
Share of permanent workers 90.66% 88.84% 77.64% 74.5%
Share of men 68.69% 64.9% 69.6% 67.56%
Share of married workers 69.79% 73.38% 68.1% 72.17%
Average education 8.9 years 9.74 years 6.1 years 6.67 years
Average age 35.52 years 35.87 years 36.01 years 36.54 years
Average no. of dependents 0.81 persons 0.72 persons 0.80 persons 0.78 persons
Deﬁnition 2 of informality
Share of total employment 41.47% 45.22% 58.63% 54.78%
Share of permanent workers 86.6% 84.95% 81.27% 79.24%
Share of men 70.53% 66.8% 68.24% 65.75%
Share of married workers 69.71% 72.43% 68.39% 73.09%
Average education 8.93 years 9.79 years 6.29 years 6.95 years
Average age 34.7 years 35.02 years 36.57 years 37.17 years
Average no. of dependents 0.84 persons 0.77 persons 0.78 persons 0.73 persons
Notes: The table reports proportions and means of the variables in the formal and informal sectors be-
fore and after the reform using two alternative deﬁnitions of informality. The proportions and means us-
ing the ﬁrst deﬁnition are presented ﬁrst, while those using the second deﬁnition are presented second.
Under deﬁnition 1, workers are deﬁned as those whose employers pay social security taxes and informal
workers are those whose employer does not pay social security contributions. Under deﬁnition 2, formal
workers are deﬁned as wage earners employed by ﬁrms with more than ten employees and informal
workers are family workers, domestic workers, self-employed workers, and wage earners employed by
ﬁrms with less than ten employees. In Colombia, family workers, the self-employed, and workers em-
ployed by ﬁrms with less than ﬁve employees are completely exempt from severance pay legislation, while
domestic workers and workers employed by ﬁrms with little capital are subject to half the severance pay-
ments of workers completely covered by the legislation.tance of controlling also for ﬁrm characteristics, as the composition of for-
mal ﬁrms may have also changed. Although the NHS oﬀers little informa-
tion on ﬁrm characteristics, the hazard models that follow do control for
industry aﬃliation. Moreover, the fact that the increase in the size of the
formal sector was small and that it cannot be directly attributed to the re-
form suggests that the selection biases described previously may not be of
great concern.
Sampling Plan
The June NHSs include information on tenure on the current job (in
years) and on the duration of unemployment (in months) right before en-
tering the current job that allows us to estimate hazard rates. In particular,
the survey asks currently employed workers “How long have you been
working on your current job?” and “How long were you unemployed be-
tween your current job and your previous job?” The data thus provide in-
formation on incomplete employment spells of currently employed work-
ers, and on complete unemployment spells of workers who are currently
employed and had a previous job (see ﬁgure 3.1).
The stock sampling for the employment spells generates two types of
biases. First, the sampled employment spells are too short because of the
sampling of incomplete employment spells. In particular, Heckman and
Singer (1985) show that, under the assumptions of a time homogenous en-
vironment, no heterogeneity, and independence between employment and
unemployment spells, the completed spells would be on average twice as
long. Second, as a consequence of sampling currently employed workers,
the incomplete employment spells are longer than the completed spells
from a sample that follows worker ﬂows from job to job over time. Thus,
the sampling of currently employed workers introduces length bias. Heck-
man and Singer (1985) show, however, that under the assumptions stated
and, in addition, under the assumption of no duration dependence the two
biases exactly cancel out. I will estimate exponential hazard models that
impose these assumptions.
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Fig. 3.1 Sampling of employment and unemployment spells in the June surveysSimilarly, the stock sampling of the unemployment spells may also in-
troduce a number of biases. Although the data provide complete unem-
ployment spells, the fact that the spells are drawn from a sample of work-
ers who are currently employed and had a previous job may generate
biased estimates. First, sampling currently employed workers introduces
length bias. This is because one oversamples workers with short spells rel-
ative to long spells. Thus, the mean of the sampled spells would be shorter
than the mean of the spells from a ﬂow sample. Second, sampling workers
who had a previous job excludes all new entrants into the labor force, and
this introduces another type of length bias. By excluding new entrants from
the sample, one oversamples workers with long spells relative to short
spells, implying that the mean of the sampled spells would be shorter than
the mean of the spells from a ﬂow sample. Although the distribution of un-
employment spells obtained from this sampling plan is likely to be dis-
torted, the bias due to stock sampling may be small in practice because the
two biases have opposite signs and thus may cancel out.
3.6.2 Tenure and Unemployment Spells, Before and After the Reform
Average Tenure
The model I have presented indicates that the direct and indirect eﬀects
of the reduction in ﬁring costs introduced by the reform should have in-
creased the exit rates out of employment for formal workers relative to in-
formal workers. Thus, the reform should have reduced the average tenure
of workers covered by the reform (formal workers) relative to the tenure of
uncovered workers (informal workers).15
Table 3.4 presents the average tenure for the covered and uncovered
groups (using the ﬁrst deﬁnition) before and after the Colombian labor
market reform of 1990.16 The ﬁrst row corresponds to the average tenure
after the reform, the second row corresponds to the average tenure prior to
the reform, and the third row corresponds to the diﬀerences. The last row
provides the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of the reform
on tenure. The average tenure of covered workers decreased after the re-
form from 5.6002 to 5.3130 years. The decrease in average tenure for cov-
ered workers was of 3.4452 months and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
In contrast, the decrease in average tenure for uncovered workers was of
0.2112 months and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of the reform was a reduction in aver-
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15. In particular, the average tenure of formal workers should decrease because the fraction
of workers with short tenures (those just hired) increases and/or the fraction of workers with
long tenures (those just ﬁred) decreases.
16. This section and the rest of the analysis rely on the ﬁrst deﬁnitions of formal and infor-
mal since the two measures are highly correlated and the results are robust to the deﬁnition
used.age tenure of 3.6612 months. The eﬀect is large and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, and, as predicted by the theory, most of the change comes from
the reduction in average tenure of covered workers rather than from the
increase in average tenures of uncovered workers. Table 3.5 presents the
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of the reform on average tenure by
gender. This table shows that most of the change in the aggregate ﬁgures
is driven by the eﬀect of the reform on men’s tenures. The diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of the reform was a reduction of 4.1208
months for men and of 2.1012 months for women, although the eﬀect is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for women.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of the
reform for diﬀerent age and education groups. Table 3.6 shows that the ef-
fect of the reform was greatest for middle-aged workers. The diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect was a reduction of 4.0176 months for
middle-aged workers, while the estimates for young and older workers were
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. These results are consistent with the
change in severance pay legislation and with the change in unjust dismissal
legislation that raised the cost of unjustly dismissing workers with more
than ten years of tenure. In particular, the change in the legislation should
have induced ﬁrms to dismiss workers just prior to completing ten years of
tenure. This result is conﬁrmed in the next section with the formal hazard
analysis. In contrast, table 3.7 shows that the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences es-
timates of the eﬀects of the reform were greatest for employees with pri-
mary education and with a university degree or more education. This re-
sult, however, inverts itself in the formal hazard analysis that controls for
changes in turnover for these groups after the reform.
Table 3.8shows the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of the eﬀect of the
reform by sector, to identify whether the reduction in tenures could have
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.been the result of trade liberalization. This table shows that the diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences estimates for agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construc-
tion, and commerce are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional
levels. Moreover, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimate of the reform was
ar eduction of 6.4836 months in transportation, which was only signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent level; a reduction of 10.7028 months in ﬁnancial services,
only signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; and a reduction of 10.236 months in
services, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Thus, the estimates by sector do
not show a consistent pattern of changes across tradable and nontradable
sectors. These results are conﬁrmed by the formal hazard analysis that will
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Table 3.5 Sample Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates of the Eﬀect of the Reform
on Average Tenure, by Gender
Men \Women
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Postreform 5.57424 4.9987 4.5173 3.5772
(0.0610) (0.0636) (0.0659) (0.0749)
Prereform 6.1141 5.0270 4.4730 3.3577
(0.0812) (0.0753) (0.0914) (0.0842)
Diﬀerences –0.3717∗∗∗ –0.0283 0.0443 0.2194∗∗
(0.1016) (0.0986) (0.1127) (0.1127)
Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences –0.3434∗∗∗ –0.1751
(0.1416) (0.1594)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 3.6 Sample Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates of the Eﬀect of the Reform on Average
Tenure, by Age Group
Age   24 years 24–55 years Age   55 Years
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Postreform 1.6480 1.4058 5.3971 4.5180 11.2889 10.1111
(0.0331) (0.03030) (0.0821) (0.0525) (0.2860) (0.2523)
Prereform 1.6107 1.3709 5.7419 4.5280 12.3513 10.7321
(0.0394) (0.0309) (0.0663) (0.0615) (0.3589) (0.3008)
Diﬀerences 0.0372 0.0349 –0.3448∗∗∗ –0.0100 –1.0624∗∗∗ –0.6209∗
(0.0515) (0.0433) (0.0821) (0.0808) (0.4589) (0.3926)
Diﬀerences-in- 0.0023 –0.3348∗∗∗ –0.4414
diﬀerences (0.0684) (0.1156) (0.2111)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.be presented. Moreover, consistent with the changes predicted by the labor
market reform, the changes that are signiﬁcant are driven by reductions in
the tenures of covered workers and not by the increase in tenures of uncov-
ered workers.
Table 3.9shows the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates by ﬁrm size. The
results show that the eﬀects of the reform were greatest for larger ﬁrms, as
predicted by the changes in the legislation. The diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
estimates for the self-employed and for workers employed in ﬁrms with two
to ﬁve employees and in ﬁrms with ﬁve to ten employees are not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero. In contrast, the estimate of the eﬀect of the
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Table 3.8 Sample Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates of the Eﬀect of the Reform on Average
Tenure, by Industry
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing
Postreform 5.6232 5.0688 5.8725 4.1875 5.3031 4.2360
(0.3975) (0.4503) (0.4731) (0.8474) (0.0915) (0.1128)
Prereform 5.724 6.0402 4.4010 3.4091 5.0920 4.3843
(0.6194) (0.4503) (0.5431) (0.7922) (0.1164) (0.1438)
Diﬀerences –0.1008 –0.9714 1.4716∗∗ 0.7784 0.2112∗ –0.1483
(0.7359) (0.6947) (0.7245) (1.1601) (0.1481) (0.1827)
Diﬀerences-in- 0.8706 0.6931 0.3595
diﬀerences (1.0964) (1.3608) (0.2341)
Utilities Construction Commerce
Postreform 6.8926 — 4.0121 4.2889 4.5763 4.9136
(0.3778) — (0.1859) (0.1729) (0.0823) (0.0862)
Prereform 7.9114 — 4.0532 3.4439 4.6654 4.9855
(0.4736) — (0.2558) (0.1904) (0.1217) (0.1001)
Diﬀerences –1.0188∗∗∗ — 0.0411 0.8449∗∗∗ –0.0892 –0.0719
(0.6059) — (0.3163) (0.2572) (0.1469) (0.1321)
Diﬀerences-in- — –0.8861 –0.0173
diﬀerences — (0.4382) (0.2046)
Transportation Financial Services Services
Postreform 5.22 4.5496 4.8835 5.1026 6.2118 4.2454
(0.1766) (0.1564) (0.1364) (0.2744) (0.0992) (0.0985)
Prereform 6.1895 4.9789 5.6848 5.0121 6.8428 4.0234
(0.2455) (0.2144) (0.2072) (0.3692) (0.1332) (0.1053)
Diﬀerences –0.9695∗∗∗ 0.4292∗∗ –0.8013∗∗∗ 0.0905 –0.6310∗∗∗ 0.2220∗
(0.3025) (0.2654) (0.2480) (1.2636) (0.1661) (0.1442)
Diﬀerences-in- –0.5403† –0.8919∗∗ –0.8530∗∗∗
diﬀerences (0.4009) (0.4961) (0.2189)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.reform for workers employed in ﬁrms with more than ten employees was a
reduction of 6.3372 months. The eﬀect of the reform on workers employed
by large ﬁrms is big, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and driven mainly by
a reduction of tenures of covered workers rather than by an increase of the
tenures of uncovered workers. This evidence is strongly consistent with the
expected eﬀects of a reduction in ﬁring costs, since the self-employed and
workers employed in ﬁrms with less than ﬁve employees are completely ex-
empt from severance, and workers employed in ﬁrms with little capital are
only entitled to partial severance payments.
Unemployment Duration
The model predicts that a reduction in dismissal costs should increase
the exit rate out of unemployment and into formal jobs relative to the exit
rate out of unemployment and into informal jobs. Thus, the reduction in
severance payments would be expected to shorten unemployment spells of
workers hired into formal jobs relative to those of workers hired into in-
formal jobs.17
Table 3.10 presents the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of unem-
ployment spells.18The average unemployment spell for workers whose spell
ended with a formal-sector job increased. However, the average unemploy-
ment spell of workers whose spell ended in an informal-sector job length-
ened by even more than that of formal workers. Thus, the diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimate was a reduction in the average unemployment spell 
of 3.1108 weeks and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.19 Table 3.11 presents
the results for men and women separately. The diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
estimate for men was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but the eﬀect on
women was a shortening of the average unemployment spell of 7.9672
weeks and was signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Table 3.12 presents the
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates for diﬀerent age groups, and table 3.13
presents the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates for diﬀerent education
groups. The results show that unemployment spells decreased most for
young and middle-aged workers. This result is consistent with the expecta-
tion that a decrease in ﬁring costs should increase hiring, especially for out-
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17. In particular, the average unemployment spell of those going into formal jobs should
decline because the increased probability of being hired into a formal ﬁrm should reduce the
fraction of workers with long spells. Moreover, the fraction of workers with short spells (those
just ﬁred from formal jobs) increases.
18. Unemployed workers are deﬁned as formal if the job subsequent to their unemployed
spell was in the formal sector and as informal if their job subsequent to the unemployed spell
was in the informal sector.
19. Contrary to the results for tenure, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences results for unemploy-
ment spells are driven mainly by the lengthening of the spells of those exiting into the infor-
mal sector. This is, however, consistent with the model previously presented. On the one hand,
the model predicts that the probability of being hired in the formal sector should rise after the
reform because of the increase in the number of ﬁrms producing in this sector. On the other
hand, the probability of being hired into the informal sector falls unambiguously.siders, and is also conﬁrmed in the formal hazard analysis that follows.
Moreover, table 3.13 shows that the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates are
greatest for workers with incomplete secondary or incomplete university
education. Thus, the ﬁring cost eﬀect on hiring appears to be greater on
workers that are risky hires. This is also conﬁrmed by the formal hazard
analysis.
Table 3.14 presents the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of the eﬀect
of the reform on unemployment spells by industry. The diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in agricul-
ture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, transportation, and
ﬁnancial services. Only the eﬀects on commerce and services are signiﬁ-
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Table 3.10 Sample Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates of the Eﬀect of the Reform










Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.11 Sample Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates of the Eﬀect of the Reform
on Average Unemployment Duration, by Gender
Men Women
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Postreform 6.6402 7.3753 9.3743 14.7665
(0.1284) (0.1420) (0.2394) (0.3413)
Prereform 6.3455 6.9092 9.4983 12.8988
(0.1536) (0.1569) (0.3321) (0.3894)
Diﬀerences 0.2947∗∗ 0.4660∗∗∗ –0.1240 1.8678∗∗∗
(0.2002) (0.2116) (0.4094) (0.5178)
Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences –0.1713 –1.9918∗∗∗
(0.2925) (0.6592)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.cantly diﬀerent from zero. The diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimate of the
eﬀect of the reform was a reduction of 1.2746 weeks of the unemployment
spell in commerce, which was only signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, and a
reduction of 1.3126 weeks of the unemployment spell in services, which
was signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Thus, as for tenure, the results do not
show a consistent pattern of a diﬀerential impact on tradable and non-
tradable sectors. In contrast, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates by
ﬁrm size in table 3.15 provide some evidence that the ﬁring cost eﬀect was
greatest among larger ﬁrms. In particular, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences es-
timates of the reform on ﬁrms with ﬁve to ten employees and on ﬁrms with
more than ten employees indicate reductions of the average unemployment
spell of 0.8038 weeks and of 0.2913 weeks, respectively. Although neither
eﬀect is signiﬁcant at conventional levels, the p-values for the diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences estimates of larger ﬁrms are greater than the p-values for the
estimates of the self-employed and of ﬁrms with two to ﬁve employees.
3.6.3 Employment and Unemployment Survivor Functions, 
Before and After the Reform
While the previous section presented the implied eﬀects of the reform on
tenure and unemployment spells, this section presents evidence on the
eﬀects of the reform on the survival probabilities in employment and un-
employment. If the reduction of dismissal costs introduced by the reform
was indeed important, then the probability of survival in a formal job
should have fallen after the reform relative to the probability of survival in
an informal job. In addition, if the reduction in dismissal costs generated
more hiring, then the probability of survival in unemployment should have
fallen after the reform for workers exiting into formal jobs relative to those
exiting into informal jobs.
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Table 3.12 Sample Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates of the Eﬀect of the Reform on Average
Unemployment Duration, by Age Group
Age   24 years 24–55 Years Age   55 Years
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Postreform 5.0951 5.7650 7.6482 10.0925 11.7779 14.7266
(0.1924) (0.1940) (0.1328) (0.1813) (0.6590) (0.6043)
Prereform 5.3906 5.2083 7.5569 9.2324 9.0156 12.8679
(0.2454) (0.1823) (0.1729) (0.2077) (0.7171) (0.6642)
Diﬀerences –0.2956 0.5567∗∗∗ 0.0914 0.8601∗∗∗ 2.7623∗∗∗ 1.8587∗∗
(0.3118) (0.2662) (0.2180) (0.2757) (0.9739) (0.8979)
Diﬀerences-in- –0.8523∗∗ –0.7688∗∗∗ 0.9037
diﬀerences (0.4184) (0.3481) (0.1396)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 3.2 presents the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for employ-
ment. This ﬁgure includes the probabilities of survival for formal and in-
formal workers before and after the reform. The ﬁgure shows that the prob-
ability that a formal job lasts more than two years decreased after the
reform. For tenures of more than two years, the survivor function of for-
mal workers after the reform (formal/Post90) shifts down with respect to
the survivor function of formal workers before the reform (formal/Pre90).
However, for tenures of less than two years, the survivor function of formal
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Table 3.14 Sample Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates of the Eﬀect of the Reform on Average
Unemployment Duration, by Industry
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing
Postreform 6.5332 6.5428 6.0294 6.2292 7.2766 10.2512
(0.9948) (0.8265) (1.1816) (2.2612) (0.2177) (0.3665)
Prereform 7.812 6.3489 5.9455 6.5606 7.4136 9.9015
(1.3781) (0.8538) (1.1462) (2.0028) (0.2703) (0.4279)
Diﬀerences –1.2788 0.1939 0.0839 –0.3314 –0.1370 0.3496
(1.6995) (1.1883) (1.6462) (3.0207) (0.3471) (0.5634)
Diﬀerences-in- –1.4728 0.4153 –0.4866
diﬀerences (2.0497) (3.2289) (0.6275)
Utilities Construction Commerce
Postreform 9.8 6.5 5.8669 5.3911 7.4709 11.59
(1.1168) (1.6065) (0.4841) (0.2734) (0.2522) (0.2940)
Prereform 6.4314 3 5.4792 4.8239 7.4513 10.3010
(0.8747) (1.5) (0.5700) (0.2947) (0.3427) (0.3118)
Diﬀerences 3.3686∗∗∗ 3.5∗ 0.3878 0.5671∗ 0.0197 1.2943
(1.4186) (2.1979) (0.7478) (0.4019) (0.4254) (0.4286)
Diﬀerences-in- –0.1314 –0.1794 –1.2746∗∗
diﬀerences (6.2663) (0.7816) (0.6425)
Transportation Financial Services Services
Postreform 6.3961 6.9820 6.9234 9.6664 8.8563 10.1112
(0.3678) (0.3759) (0.3546) (0.7508) (0.2602) (0.3019)
Prereform 6.6343 6.4011 6.6883 10.1782 8.0041 7.9464
(0.5120) (0.4580) (0.4317) (1.0164) (0.3233) (0.2956)
Diﬀerences –0.2381 0.5809 0.2351 0.5119 0.8522∗∗ 2.1648∗∗∗
(0.6304) (0.5925) (0.5586) (1.2636) (0.4150) (0.4226)
Diﬀerences-in- –0.8190 –0.7470 –1.3126∗∗∗
diﬀerences (0.8679) (1.1993) (0.5924)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.workers after the reform shifted up from what it had been before the re-
form. That survivor function is greater for formal workers with less than
two years of tenure after the reform is surprising, given the extension by the
reform of the use of temporary contracts for less than a year. However, this
shift in the survivor function for those with less than two years of tenure
may simply reﬂect the greater hiring of new permanent workers after the
reform, as will be shown in the estimation of formal hazard models. The
downward shift of the survivor function of formal workers after the reform
is consistent with the reduction in dismissal costs for formal ﬁrms after the
reform. In contrast, however, ﬁgure 3.2 shows that the probability of sur-
vival increased slightly for informal workers after the reform relative to the
probability prior to the reform. The survivor function of uncovered work-
ers after the reform (informal/Post90) shifted up slightly from its level be-
fore the reform (informal/Pre90). If common shocks to both groups were
responsible for the decreased probability of survival of formal jobs, then
the ﬁgure should also show a downward shift of the survivor function for
informal workers. Moreover, consistent with the fact that formal workers
are covered by job security regulations while informal workers are not, the
survivor functions for formal workers are higher than the survivor func-
tions of informal workers both before and after the reform. The survivor
functions for the covered and uncovered groups, as well as the shifts of the
survivor functions for each group after the reform, are thus consistent with
the predicted eﬀects of ﬁring costs and with the predicted eﬀects of the re-
form on formal turnover.
Standard Kaplan-Meier survival functions of unemployment show a
similar change after the reform. Figure 3.3 shows that the unemployment
survival functions of formal hires shifted down between the prereform 
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Fig. 3.2 Kaplan-Meier employment survival estimates, by period and coverage(formal/Pre90) and postreform (formal/Post90) periods. Thus, for every
unemployment spell of duration t, the probability of remaining unem-
ployed decreased after the reform for those who exited into formal em-
ployment. In contrast, ﬁgure 3.3 shows that the unemployment survival
functions increased slightly for informal workers after the reform. These
shifts are consistent with the expected eﬀects of the reform. The reduction
of ﬁring costs would have predicted that the probability of remaining un-
employed at every time t should have decreased for workers covered by the
reform but not for uncovered workers. Moreover, the next section shows
that the escape rates into and out of unemployment increased for formal
workers relative to informal workers, even after controlling for observable
characteristics.
3.6.4 Formal Hazard Models
It is possible that the employment and unemployment spells and the sur-
vivor functions presented in the foregoing sections changed after the re-
form due to changes in the characteristics of workers and jobs after 1990.
Thus, I will proceed to estimate formal duration models that allow the
eﬀects of changes in worker and job characteristics on exit hazard rates to
be controlled for.
As described in section 3.4, I estimate exponential hazard models that
control for age, education, marital status, city, industry of employment,
and the number of dependents. More important, these formal hazard mod-
els can capture the eﬀects of the reform. The models include a formal
dummy that controls for diﬀerential turnover patterns across groups, a
Post90 dummy that captures the diﬀerential turnover pattern in turnover
after 1990 for all groups, and an interaction term of the formal and Post90
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Fig. 3.3 Kaplan-Meier unemployment survival estimates, by period and coveragedummies that captures the eﬀect of the reform. In particular, the coeﬃcient
of the interaction term can be interpreted as the diﬀerential hazard rates
of covered workers after the reform was introduced. Moreover, to further
probe the importance of the reform, other speciﬁcations of the model are
included to test whether the eﬀects of the reform showed the expected pat-
terns for diﬀerent groups. In addition, to test the importance of trade
shocks, a speciﬁcation of the model that includes interaction terms of the
formal   Post90 dummy with sector dummies is also estimated.
Table 3.16 shows the results of the estimation of exponential exit hazard
rates out of employment. Column (1) presents the estimates obtained from
the basic speciﬁcation of the model that includes the covariates previously
mentioned, the formal dummy, the Post90 dummy, and the interaction
term of the two. The results show the expected signs. The hazards are
higher for younger, more educated, female, and single workers and for
workers with smaller number of dependents. The results also show that the
hazards out of employment decreased during the post-1990 period for in-
formal workers. Moreover, as expected, formal workers, who are covered
by the legislation, have lower hazards out of employment than do informal
workers. Most important, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. In particular, the coeﬃcient indicates
that after the reform covered workers are 6.17 percent more likely to exit
employment than are uncovered workers. This result suggests that the re-
duction in ﬁring costs introduced by the reform substantially increased the
exit rates out of employment. Exit hazards out of employment are likely to
have increased after the reform, both because of the increase in dismissals
and because of the increase in employees’ quitting that results from greater
hiring after the reform.
Another essential feature of the reform was the greater ﬂexibility in the
use of temporary (ﬁxed-term) contracts, and one may thus suspect that a
great deal of the increases in turnover after the reform may simply be the
result of increased hiring of temporary workers in the formal sector. The
speciﬁcation in column (2) allows us to distinguish whether the increase in
the exit rates out of employment was purely the result of the increase in the
use of temporary contracts or if the reduction in the cost of ﬁring perma-
nent workers also played a role. Column (2) in table 3.16 presents the esti-
mates of a model including a permanent dummy, an interaction term of the
Post90 dummy and the permanent dummy, an interaction term of the for-
mal dummy and the Permanent dummy, and an interaction of the formal
  Post90 dummy with the Permanent dummy.20 All the coeﬃcients have
the same signs as before, and the coeﬃcient on the Permanent dummy is
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20. The permanent dummy takes the value of 1 if the worker is a permanent worker and
zero if the worker is temporary.Table 3.16 Exponential Hazard Model Estimates of Employment Duration
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal –0.2286 0.1354 –0.0853 –0.2409
(0.0113) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0105)
Post90 –0.1247 –0.0508 –0.0483 0.0688
(0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0080)
Formal   Post 90 0.0617 0.0673 0.0279 0.0284
(0.0015) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0129)
Permanent –0.3939
(0.0021)
Formal   Permanent –0.3401
(0.0039)
Post90   Permanent 0.0268
(0.0026)
Formal   Post90   Permanent –0.0062
(0.0045)
Formal   Post90   Age 25–55 years 0.0359
(0.0029)
Formal   Post90   Age   55 years –0.0222
(0.0049)
Formal   Post90   Secondary Education 0.0124
(0.0031)
Formal   Post90   High School Degree 0.0538
(0.0035)
Formal   Post90   University Education 0.0596
(0.0035)
Formal   Post90   University Degree –0.0254
(0.0054)
Formal   Post90   Mining –0.4799
(0.0281)
Formal   Post90   Manufacturing –0.0321
(0.0133)
Formal   Post90   Utilities 1.9788
(0.0661)
Formal   Post90   Construction 0.0867
(0.0143)
Formal   Post90   Commerce –0.0033
(0.0133)
Formal   Post90   Transportation 0.1178
(0.0141)
Formal   Post90   Financial Services 0.1339
(0.0144)
Formal   Post90   Services 0.0367
(0.0133)
Log-likelihood –12.256,412 –12,131,391 –12,157,990 –12,240,447
Notes:No. of observations  55,683. The table reports changes in the employment hazard estimate with
exponential hazard models. The models include three age dummies, ﬁve education dummies, dummies
for sex and marital status, number of dependents, nine industry dummies, and six city dummies.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.negative and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, as expected. The results show
that the coeﬃcient on the formal   Post90 interaction is positive, but the
interaction term of the formal   Post90 dummy with the Permanent
dummy is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The results indi-
cate that, after the reform, the probability of exiting employment was 6.7
percent higher for temporary workers in the formal sector than for tempo-
rary workers in the uncovered sector. At the same time, the probability of
exiting employment was 6.1 percent higher for permanent workers in the
formal sector than for permanent workers in the uncovered sector after the
reform. Thus, while the introduction of temporary contracts does appear
to explain part of the increased turnover of formal workers, the results also
suggest that the reduction of dismissal costs for permanent workers also
contributed to increasing turnover.
Column (3) in table 3.16 presents the results of speciﬁcations including
interaction terms of the reform eﬀect with the age and education variables.
This speciﬁcation of the model allows us to see whether the impact of the
reform was greater on the groups that would be expected to be aﬀected
most by the changes in the legislation. First, since the reform increased the
costs of dismissing workers with more than ten years of tenure, the impact
of the reform would be expected to be greater for groups with less than ten
years of tenure (i.e., younger workers). Second, the special contracts intro-
duced by the reform, which exempted workers with more than ten times the
minimum wage from severance payments, would be expected to aﬀect most
the turnover of highly educated workers who are likely to earn more than
ten times the minimum wage. Column (3) shows that, indeed, the hazard
rates of younger and middle-aged workers increased by more than the haz-
ard rates of older workers. Young workers with secondary education hired
in the formal sector were 4.1 percent more likely to exit employment than
were younger informal workers with secondary education after the reform.
Similarly, middle-aged formal workers with secondary education were 7.9
percent more likely to exit employment than were middle-aged informal
workers with secondary education after the reform. The smallest impact of
the reform was on older formal workers, who were only 1.8 percent more
likely to exit employment than were older informal workers after the re-
form. These results are thus consistent with lower expected dismissals of
workers with more than ten years of tenure. Moreover, the results also in-
dicate that the impact of the reform was greater on more educated work-
ers, who are more likely to have beneﬁted from the use of Integral Salary
contracts. The exit rate of middle-aged formal workers with a primary ed-
ucation increased by 6.6 percent after the reform relative to middle-aged
informal workers with the same level of education. The exit rate of middle-
aged formal workers with secondary education, a high school degree, and
university education increased after the reform by 7.9 percent, 12.5 per-
cent, and 13.1 percent, respectively, relative to middle-aged informal work-
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ployment increased only by 3.8 percent for middle-aged formal workers
with more than a university degree after the reform relative to middle-aged
informal workers with the highest educational attainment. The impact was
thus smallest among the least and the most educated. The small impact on
these groups may be due to the fact that these workers have longer tenures
and consequently are more likely to have been aﬀected by the increase in
the costs of unjust dismissals for tenures of more than ten years.
While these patterns are consistent with the eﬀects of the labor market
reform on diﬀerent groups, it may be that part of the increased turnover is
the result of trade shocks that aﬀect various groups diﬀerently. Column (4)
in table 3.16 presents the results from an exponential hazard model that in-
cludes interaction terms of the formal   Post90 dummy with sector dum-
mies. The idea is that if trade liberalization were responsible for the in-
creased turnover after the labor market reform, then the observed impact
would be greater on workers employed in tradable sectors than on those
employed in nontradable sectors. The results from Column (4) in table 3.16
show that the increase in turnover of covered workers after the reform was
greater in utilities, transportation, construction, and services. The proba-
bility of exiting formal employment in these sectors after the reform was
640 percent, 15.7 percent, 12.3 percent, and 17.6 percent greater than the
probability of exiting informal employment in these sectors. However, if
the trade shocks were a main source of the increased turnover, it would be
expected that the exit rate out of employment would have increased more
for workers hired in trade-intensive sectors such as commerce and manu-
facturing. In fact, after the reform formal workers in commerce were only
2.5 percent more likely to exit employment than were informal workers in
this sector. Moreover, the probability of exiting employment was 1 percent
lower after the reform for formal workers relative to informal workers hired
in manufacturing. Thus, the results from the exponential hazard model do
not provide any reason to believe that trade liberalization increased turn-
over for covered workers after 1990.
Table 3.17 includes the results of exponential hazards out of unemploy-
ment. Given the reduction of mandated ﬁring costs, one would expect
greater hiring in the covered sector and a corresponding increase in the es-
cape rate out of unemployment for workers hired into formal-sector jobs.
Column (1) shows that, indeed, the exit hazard out of unemployment in-
creased by 5.75 percent for covered workers after the reform relative to un-
covered workers.21 Moreover, while the extension of temporary contracts
appears to explain part of the increased hiring, most of the increase in the
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21. The sign on the formal dummy is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. This
could be explained if unsuccessful discouraged workers who get tired of searching for formal
work turned to the informal sector as a last resource.Table 3.17 Exponential Hazard Models of Unemployment Duration
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal 0.0575 –0.0070 –0.1752 –0.3308
(0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0107)
Post90 –0.0450 –0.0255 –0.1202 0.0563
(0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0081)
Formal   Post 90 0.0575 0.0400 0.0827 0.3271
(0.0016) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0131)
Permanent 0.2676
(0.0022)
Formal   Permanent 0.1335
(0.0039)
Post90   Permanent –0.0092
(0.0026)
Formal   Post90   Permanent 0.0208
(0.0046)
Formal   Post90   Age 25–55 years –0.1908
(0.0041)
Formal   Post90   Age   55 years –0.3479
(0.0066)
Formal   Post90   Secondary Education 0.1468
(0.0041)
Formal   Post90   High School Degree 0.1195
(0.0047)
Formal   Post90   University Education 0.4229
(0.0072)
Formal   Post90   University Degree 0.2184
(0.0066)
Formal   Post90   Mining 0.0493
(0.0282)
Formal   Post90   Manufacturing –0.2995
(0.0135)
Formal   Post90   Utilities –0.0830
(0.0661)
Formal   Post90   Construction –0.3426
(0.0145)
Formal   Post90   Commerce –0.2617
(0.0134)
Formal   Post90   Transportation –0.2872
(0.0142)
Formal   Post90   Financial Services –0.3947
(0.0146)
Formal   Post90   Services –0.2237
(0.0134)
Log-likelihood –17,671,211 –17,613,645 –17,639,878 –17,643,799
Notes: No. of observations   55,683. The table reports changes in the unemployment hazard estimate
with exponential hazard models. The models include three age dummies, ﬁve education dummies, dum-
mies for sex and marital status, number of dependents, nine industry dummies, and six city dummies.
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.exit hazards out of unemployment is due to the increased hazards into per-
manent jobs in the formal sector. The results from column (2) in table 3.17
show that the escape rate out of unemployment increased by 4 percent for
formal temporary workers after the reform relative to temporary informal
workers. However, the exit rate out of unemployment increased by even
more for formal permanent workers after the reform, indicating that the re-
duction in dismissal costs of permanent workers did increase the incentives
to hire this type of workers. The results show that the probability of exiting
unemployment and entering a formal permanent job increased by 6.1 per-
cent after the reform relative to the probability of entering an informal per-
manent job.22
Column (3) in table 3.17 presents the results of the exponential hazard
model, including interaction terms of the reform eﬀect with the age and
education variables. The estimates from this model show that, as for the
hazards out of employment, the impact of the reform was greater on
younger and more educated workers. The reform should have had greater
eﬀects on the exit rates out of unemployment for younger workers if the re-
duction in dismissal costs decreased the power of insiders and induced
more hiring of young outsiders. In fact, the exit rate out of unemployment
and into formal jobs for young workers increased by 25.8 percent after the
reform relative to the exit rate into informal jobs. The exit rate into formal
jobs for middle-aged workers also increased after the reform, but not by as
much. In particular, the hazard rate out of unemployment and into formal
jobs increased by 3.9 percent for middle-aged workers relative to informal
workers. In contrast, the hazard rates out of unemployment and into for-
mal jobs decreased by 11.1 percent for older workers after the reform rela-
tive to those entering informal jobs. In addition, these results show that the
impact of the reform on exit hazard rates out of unemployment was great-
est on the more educated. This is to be expected, given that these workers
are the ones more likely to opt for the Integral Salary contract that exempts
workers from severance and other dismissal costs. In fact, the hazards out
of unemployment and into formal jobs decreased after the reform by 10
percent relative to the hazard out of unemployment and into informal jobs
for workers with primary education and by 3.9 percent and 1.2 percent for
workers with secondary schooling and a high school degree, respectively.
In contrast, after the reform, the exit rates out of unemployment and into
formal jobs increased by 37 percent for university graduates and by 12 per-
cent for workers with more than a university degree relative to the exit rates
into informal jobs.
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22. The sign on the permanent dummy is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. As
in note 21, this is probably due to the possibility that discouraged workers who are unsuc-
cessful in ﬁnding a permanent position turn to temporary jobs as a last resource.Finally, column (4) in table 3.17 shows the results of the hazard model
with sector dummy and reform interactions. The results show that the in-
crease in the exit rates out of unemployment after the reform was greater
for workers exiting into formal-sector jobs in mining, utilities, and services.
The probability of exiting unemployment into formal employment in these
sectors after the reform was 45.7 percent, 27.6 percent, and 10.9 percent
greater than the probability of exiting unemployment into informal em-
ployment in these sectors. However, the probability of exiting unemploy-
ment into formal employment in trade-intensive sectors such as commerce
and manufacturing was only 2.8 percent and 6.7 percent higher than the
probability of exiting unemployment into informal employment in these
sectors. Thus, like the results from the employment hazard models, these
results from the unemployment hazard model do not provide evidence
to indicate the importance of trade liberalization in increasing worker
turnover after 1990. Instead, the increased hazards in utilities and services,
which are more likely to be public-sector jobs covered by the legislation, in-
dicate the importance of the labor market reform in generating these pat-
terns in turnover.
3.7 Worker Turnover and Unemployment
The previous section showed that the functioning of labor markets
changed substantially in Colombia after the introduction of the labor mar-
ket reform of 1990. In particular, the estimates from the formal hazards
show that, after controlling for observable characteristics, the postreform
period was characterized by higher exit rates into and out of unemploy-
ment in the formal sector relative to the informal sector.
While the results in the previous section indicate that the reform in-
creased labor market ﬂexibility by increasing the ﬂows into and out of un-
employment, the net eﬀects of the reform on employment and unemploy-
ment are ambiguous. In this section, I use the steady-state condition of the
model in section 3.4, together with the hazard rate results obtained in sec-
tion 3.6, to obtain a rough estimate of the net eﬀect of the reform on un-
employment.
In the previous model, a steady-state condition has to be satisﬁed such
that the ﬂow into unemployment from both sectors must equal the ﬂow out
of unemployment and into both sectors:
 FeF    q( )[1   F(Acrit)]G(   F)u    IeI    q( )F(Acrit)G(   I)u
   q( )[1   F(Acrit)]u    q( )F(Acrit)u
Substituting for employment in each sector, eF   (1 – F[Acrit])e and eI  
F(Acrit)e, and for the identity, e   u   1, and solving for u yields the follow-
ing formula for the unemployment rate:
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The unemployment rate can be estimated from this equation by substitut-
ing for the average hazard rates into and out of unemployment during the
prereform period and the shares in each sector. The average hazard rates
are estimated with the average tenure and unemployment spells in tables
3.4 and 3.10, which indicate an average tenure of 67.2 and 54.2 months in
the formal and informal sectors and average unemployment spells of 1.8
and 2.2 months in the formal and informal sectors during the prereform
period. The shares of formal and informal employment are reported in
table 3.1. Before the reform, the shares of formal and informal employment
were 0.45 and 0.55, respectively. After the reform, the shares of formal and
informal employment changed to 0.51 and 0.49, respectively. Finally,
tables 3.16 and 3.17 show an increase in the hazards into and out of unem-
ployment of 6.17 percent and 5.75 percent.
As the model abstracts from many factors aﬀecting labor markets, the
estimated unemployment obtained from the previous formula should not
be interpreted as a precise estimate of the unemployment rate but rather as
an indication of the magnitude of the changes in unemployment rates be-
tween the two periods. For example, taking into account other ﬂows such




where  ,  , and   are the ﬂows due to retirements, new entries, and deaths,
which are estimated assuming a working life of thirty-ﬁve years, entry at
eighteen years of age, and a life expectancy of sixty years for those who die
before retiring.
The unemployment rate for the prereform period obtained with this for-
mula is 4.84 percent, which is lower than the true unemployment rate of
11.8 percent in Colombia in 1988. The postreform unemployment rate es-
timated with the postreform shares is 4.69 percent, which is also lower than
the true unemployment in 1992 and 1996, which was 10.2 percent and 10
percent, respectively. These results suggest a reduction in unemployment
of 0.15 percent points between the pre- and postreform periods, compared
to the actual reduction in unemployment of 1.6 percent between 1988 and
1992 and of 1.8 percent between 1988 and 1996. These results suggest that
the reform contributed to about 10 percent of the reduction in the unem-
ployment rate between the pre- and postreform periods.
      [1   F(Acrit) F   F(Acrit) I           
      [1   F(Acrit)] F   F(Acrit) I   [1   F(Acrit)] q( )[1   G(   F)]   F(Acrit) q( )[1   G(   I)]
[1  F(Acrit)] F F(Acrit) I         
[1  F(Acrit)] F F(Acrit) I [1  F(Acrit)] q( )[1  G(   F)]  F(Acrit) q( )[1  G(   I)]
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The Colombian labor market reform of 1990 provides an interesting
quasi-experiment with which to analyze the eﬀects of a reduction in ﬁring
costs. This study exploited the temporal change in the legislation together
with the diﬀerence in coverage between formal and informal workers to
analyze the impact of the reform on worker turnover. The diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimates indicate that the reform increased the dynamism of
the Colombian labor market by increasing the exit rates into and out of un-
employment. Moreover, aside from contributing to increased mobility in
the labor market, the reform is also likely to have contributed to increased
compliance with labor legislation by lowering the costs of formal produc-
tion. The increased churning in the labor market and the greater compli-
ance with the legislation are estimated to have contributed to about 10 per-
cent of the reduction in the unemployment rate from the late 1980s to the
early 1990s. At the same time, the reform is likely to explain in part the
surge in the unemployment rate during the late 1990s. This is because the
greater ﬂexibility in hiring and ﬁring after the reform is likely to translate
into increased hiring relative to ﬁring during expansions but in increased
ﬁrings relative to hiring during recessions.
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